

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 1782

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PASS TREASURY AND FRB

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SUBJ: OSSOLA COMMENTS ON ITALIAN FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
SITUATION

REF: ROME 1742

SUMMARY. TREASATT SAW BANK OF ITALY DIRECTOR GENERAL OSSOLA
FEBRUARY 3 TO SOLICIT HIS VIEWS ON LIRA CRISIS AND PROSPECTS
FOR ADOPTION OF EMERGENCY ECONOMIC PROGRAM, FOLLOWING
PARTICULARLY SHARP DROP OF LIRA IN EXCHANGE MARKET ON
FEBRUARY 2. TENOR OF TALK DID NOT SUGGEST THAT BANK OF
ITALY OFFICIALS WERE PANICKING AS RESULT OF CONTINUED
DEPRECIATION OF LIRA. HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO OSSOLA,
PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT ON EMERGENCY ECONOMIC MEASURES
(REFTEL) TO DEAL WITH LABOR COST AND CASH BUDGET
PROBLEMS REMAIN HIGHLY UNCERTAIN, EVEN THOUGH ITALIAN
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POLITICIANS HAVE BEEN FRIGHTENED BY CURRENT LIRA CRISIS

INTO TAKING THESE PROBLEMS MORE SERIOUSLY. END SUMMARY.

1. LABOR COSTS AND BUDGET DEFICITS. DR. OSSOLA WAS MORE HARRIED THAN USUAL DURING MEETING. THIS WAS PARTLY RESULT OF ITALIAN PRESS COMMENTS ON FEBRUARY 3 (BOTH FAVORABLE AND CRITICAL) CONCERNING TALK WHICH HE HAD GIVEN ON FEBRUARY 2 STRESSING NEED TO DEAL WITH LABOR COST AND BUDGET DEFICIT PROBLEMS. IN HIS SPEECH (GIVEN AT OPENING OF YEARLY TRAINING COURSE FOR BANKERS), OSSOLA HAD REPORTED THAT IN PERIOD 1973-75 UNIT LABOR COSTS HAD INCREASED BY 37 PERCENT IN ITALY AGAINST INCREASE OF ONLY 16 PERCENT IN COMPETING COUNTRIES. IN SAME PERIOD AVERAGE ANNUAL INCREASE IN REAL WORKER EARNINGS IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY HAD BEEN 9.5 PERCENT IN ITALY COMPARED TO RANGE OF MAXIMUM 6.6 PERCENT (IN JAPAN) AND MINIMUM OF 0.9 PERCENT (IN UNITED STATES) OF THE MAJOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES. ALSO, EVEN DURING SECOND HALF 1975, WHEN ITALIAN RATE OF INFLATION HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLY REDUCED, IT WAS STILL DOUBLE THE AVERAGE FOR INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES AS A GROUP, TRIPLE THAT OF UNITED STATES AND FOUR TIMES THAT OF GERMANY AND JAPAN. AND IN 1975 THE CASH BUDGET DEFICIT REACHED ABOUT 14 PERCENT OF NATIONAL INCOME. OSSOLA HAD POINTED OUT THAT WIDESPREAD USE OF COST OF LIVING INDEXING OF WAGES LIMITED THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT EFFECT OF A LIRA DEPRECIATION. THIS WAS BECAUSE OF INFLATIONARY FEEDBACK THROUGH HIGHER IMPORT COSTS, CONSEQUENT RISE IN COST OF LIVING AND AUTOMATIC WAGE INCREASES THROUGH ESCALATOR CLAUSES. USE OF MONETARY POLICY BY BOI COULD NOT CONTRIBUTE MUCH TO REMOVAL OF REAL CAUSES OF CRISIS. IF MEASURES WERE NOT TAKEN TO DEAL WITH DISEQUILIBRIA BETWEEN LEVELS OF LABOR PRODUCTIVITY AND LEVELS OF LABOR INCOME, OSSOLA SAID, RESULT WOULD BE INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT, DETERIORATION OF PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM AND ITALY'S PROGRESSIVE EXCLUSION FROM EC.

2. EXCHANGE MARKET DEVELOPMENTS. DESPITE CONTINUED UNSETTLED EXCHANGE MARKET CONDITIONS, ESPECIALLY ON FEBRUARY 2, OSSOLA DID NOT INDICATE THAT BANK OR GOVERNMENT WAS CONTEMPLATING ANY TRADE OR EXCHANGE

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CONTROL RESTRICTIONS. (IN HIS SPEECH HE HAD AGAIN STRESSED FACT THAT ITALY HAS INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AGAINST TAKING SUCH MEASURES.) OSSOLA SAID THAT, IN FACE OF CONTINUED DECLINE OF LIRA IN EXCHANGE MARKET, GOI POLITICIANS STILL TEND TO HOPE THAT SOMEHOW BANK OF ITALY CAN CALM MARKET THROUGH INTERVENTION. HOWEVER, BOI OFFICIALS HAVE EXPLAINED THAT BANK DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FOREIGN RESERVES NOR PROSPECTS OF

OBTAINING SUFFICIENT FOREIGN CREDIT TO RESUME INTERVENTION ON SIGNIFICANT SCALE. FURTHERMORE, BANK OFFICIALS DO NOT WANT TO INCUR LARGE INCREASE IN FOREIGN DEBT, SINCE PROCEEDS WOULD LIKELY BE WASTED IN INEFFECTIVE MARKET INTERVENTION. WHEN ASKED WHAT GOI COULD DO ABOUT LIRA CRISIS, OSSOLA HAD TOLD MINISTER COLOMBO THAT STRICT COMPLIANCE BY ITALY WITH COMMITMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES RE DOMESTIC CREDIT EXPANSION, AMOUNT AND METHOD OF FINANCING OF TREASURY CASH DEFICIT AND RATE OF INCREASE IN BUDGET EXPENDITURES WOULD MAKE IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO DEALING WITH FINANCIAL CRISIS. DURING MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER HIGH GOVERNMENT AND BANK OFFICIALS LATE ON FEBRUARY 2, OSSOLA SAID THAT HE HAD REFUSED TO DISCUSS PROPOSED INDUSTRIAL RECONVERSION PLAN, SINCE IT MADE NO SENSE TO HIM AT PRESENT TIME AND IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO TALK ABOUT LARGE NEW EXPENDITURE PROGRAM.

3. POLITICS BEHIND ECONOMIC POLICIES. OSSOLA SAID THAT ITALIAN POLITICIANS HAVE BEEN "TRAUMATIZED" BY LIRA CRISIS INTO BEING SOMEWHAT MORE OPEN-MINDED ABOUT ADDRESSING DIFFICULT POLITICAL/ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. HOWEVER, THERE WAS STILL GREAT UNCERTAINTY AND DISARRAY IN POLITICAL CIRCLES AS TO PROPER METHOD FOR DEALING WITH LIRA CRISIS. HE THOUGHT THAT INCREASED PRESSURE (UNSPECIFIED BY OSSOLA) ON THESE POLITICIANS WAS DESIRABLE IN ORDER TO FORCE THEM TO MAKE SOME DIFFICULT ECONOMIC POLICY DECISIONS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DURING CURRENT IMF STANDBY NEGOTIATIONS FUND IS PRESSING GOI TO TAKE SOME ACTION TO DEAL WITH LABOR COST AND CASH BUDGET PROBLEMS BUT THAT IMF IS TOO REMOTE FOR ITS PRESSURES TO BE MORE THAN marginally USEFUL. EVEN BOI
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USE OF MONETARY POLICY TOOLS HAS BECOME MORE DIFFICULT THAN IN PAST. THIS IS BECAUSE MOST MONETARY MEASURES, E.G., CHANGE IN RESERVE REQUIREMENTS, DISCOUNT RATE CHANGES AND EXCHANGE CONTROL MEASURES, REQUIRE FORMAL ACTION AT POLITICAL LEVEL. IN PAST, BOI WAS ABLE TO RECOMMEND AND OBTAIN RELATIVELY EASY APPROVAL FOR SUCH MEASURES. IN CONTRAST, DURING PRESENT GOVERNMENT CRISIS EVEN MINISTERS, THEMSELVES, ARE UNWILLING TO TAKE DECISIONS AND WANT TO REFER EVERYTHING TO PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. VOLPE

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